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Orchestrating an Exclusion of Professional Workers 
from the NLRA: Has the Supreme Court Endangered 
Symphony Orchestra Musicians’ Collective 
Bargaining Rights? 
Molly Eastman∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The American Federation of Musicians (“AFM”) represents the 
musicians in America’s major orchestras.1 Unionized orchestral 
musicians are highly trained, artistic professionals. In recent years, 
the United States Supreme Court has classified many professional 
workers as managers or supervisors.2 In so doing, the Court has 
diminished professional workers’ right to unionize because managers 
and supervisors are not protected by the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”).3 One interpretation of this jurisprudence is that collective 
bargaining agreements currently covering certain orchestral 
musicians actually violate the NLRA. By endangering orchestral 
musicians’ collective bargaining rights, the Court may inadvertently 
have placed American orchestras in jeopardy. 
This Note challenges the Court’s broad exclusion of managers and 
supervisors from NLRA coverage. Part I examines the history of the 
NLRA and the Court’s historical treatment of managers and 
supervisors and outlines the basic structure of American orchestras 
and their relationship with the AFM. Part II analyzes the Court’s 
broad interpretation of the managerial and supervisory exclusions and 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate (2004), Washington University School of Law. 
 1. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS, WAGE SCALES AND CONDITIONS IN THE 
SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA 1 (2002). 
 2. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); NLRB v. Health Care & 
Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571 (1994); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 
U.S. 706 (2001). 
 3. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 681–82. 
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the potential loss of bargaining rights for certain orchestral musicians. 
Finally, Part III proposes that orchestras may protect their musicians’ 
bargaining rights by narrowly defining orchestral musicians’ roles in 
governance committees and as principal players.  
I. HISTORY 
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA in an effort to protect 
industrial workers’ rights.4 The NLRA established collective 
bargaining as the mechanism for workers to negotiate employment 
terms with their employers.5 Although the NLRA protected all 
statutorily defined “employees,” employers urged Congress to 
exclude workers exhibiting managerial and supervisory qualities 
from NLRA coverage.6 Debate over such exclusions led, in part, to 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947.7 
A. Defining Covered and Excluded Workers 
Because the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”), not 
the judiciary, retains the “primary authority” to resolve NLRA 
conflicts,8 the Board found itself in the middle of a definitional 
debate.9 Opponents of coverage for managerial-type workers relied 
on the Board to define an appropriate bargaining unit in a way that 
would not “undermine the [NLRA’s] basic purposes.”10 Meanwhile, 
 4. THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 22 (1994). 
 5. See id. at 25 (“The key choice, however, was that collective bargaining would serve as 
the cornerstone of labor-management interactions.”). 
 6. David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals 
Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775, 1782 (1989) (“[P]rofessional, supervisory, 
managerial, and confidential employees should be excluded from the Act’s definition of an 
employee. . . .”). 
 7. Id. at 1783. 
 8. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 692–93. 
 9. See, e.g., Rabban, supra note 6, at 1784 (“These disputes about supervisors 
foreshadowed subsequent debates, extending through the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva, 
about the potentially overlapping categories of managerial, supervisory, professional, and 
confidential employees.”). 
 10. Id. Opponents further argued that the integration of labor and management is against 
NLRA policy. Id. at 1785. “Opponents of including supervisors within the NLRA’s definition 
of ‘employee’ stressed the essential ‘dividing line’ between labor and management and warned 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/13
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proponents of coverage for managerial-type workers argued that the 
NLRA’s enumerated exclusion of certain workers11 precluded the 
exclusion of those workers not enumerated in the statute.12 The 
opponents of coverage, however, ultimately won the debate when 
Congress formally excluded supervisors from NLRA coverage 
through the Taft-Hartley Amendments.13 
Although the NLRA statutorily excludes supervisors, the Board 
and courts have established a common law managerial exclusion.14 
Traditionally, the Board utilized a case-by-case analysis to exclude 
managers from NLRA coverage.15 However, in NLRB v. Bell 
Aerospace Co.,16 a sharply divided Supreme Court held that the 
NLRA excludes all managerial employees from collective bargaining 
benefits.17 The Court defined managerial employees as those who 
implement company policy.18 Ultimately, the Court emphasized 
against [the] ‘commingling’ [of] their respective functions. Because supervisors . . . retain 
significant responsibilities . . . they are ‘an instrumentality of management in dealing with 
labor.’” Id. 
 11. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). 
The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the 
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, 
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in 
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and 
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but 
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic 
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent 
or spouse . . . or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed 
by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], as amended 
from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined. 
Id. (brackets in original). 
 12. Rabban, supra note 6, at 1784. Proponents further argued that “frustrating supervisors’ 
expressed desire for collective bargaining . . . would be a ‘policy of negation’ likely to increase 
industrial unrest and to promote more disloyalty than could conceivably result from collective 
bargaining.” Id. at 1787. 
 13. Id. at 1794; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include 
. . . any individual employed as a supervisor. . . .”). For the NLRA’s definition of “supervisor,” 
see infra note 67.  
 14. See Rabban, supra note 6, at 1787 (“Board opinions excluding managers from other 
bargaining units and distinguishing managers from supervisors signalled [sic] that managers, 
despite the lack of any specific exclusion, would not be permitted to bargain under the 
NLRA.”). 
 15. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 276–77 (1994). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 268–69. 
 18. Id. at 288. “The Board’s exclusion of ‘managerial employees’ defined as those who 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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divided loyalty concerns as a key reason for the complete managerial 
exclusion.19 Today, the courts use various methods to determine 
whether a worker is a manager, but most emphasize that the decisive 
factor is a particular worker’s alignment with management.20 The 
Board has outlined various factors used to ascertain alignment with 
management, such as a worker’s ability to determine policies, wages, 
budgets, and production techniques.21  
The Taft-Hartley Amendments retained professional workers’ 
coverage; by also excluding supervisors, however, the Amendments 
introduced ambiguities surrounding professional workers’ status 
under the NLRA.22 Although the NLRA explicitly covers 
professionals, recent legal developments focus on the judiciary’s 
inability to distinguish included professionals from excluded 
managers and supervisors.23 Making such a distinction is difficult 
because there is no dispositive criterion.24  
‘formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the 
decisions of their employer’ has also been approved by courts without exception.” Id. The 
Court equated managerial employees as “representatives of management” or “allied with 
management.” Id. at 286–87. The test to determine whether “employees are ‘managerial’ must 
be answered in terms of the employees’ actual job responsibilities, authority, and relationship to 
management.” Id. at 290 n.19. It is important to note that the Court emphasized that 
professional employees are not the same as managerial employees. “In contrast to ‘managerial 
employees,’ [professional employees] are not defined in terms of their authority ‘to formulate, 
determine, and effectuate management policies.’” Id. at 284 n.13 (citation omitted). 
 19. See, e.g., id. at 271 (“[B]uyers would be more receptive to bids from union contractors 
and would also influence ‘make or buy’ decisions in favor of ‘make,’ thus creating additional 
work for sister unions in the plant.”); see also id. at 285–86 (“[B]uyers . . . were excluded by 
the Board on the ground that ‘the interests of these employees are more closely identified with 
those of management.”). 
 20. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 695–96 (1980) (“The touchstone of 
managerial status is thus an alliance with management, and the pivotal inquiry is whether the 
employee in performing his duties represents his own interests or those of his employer.”); see 
also id. at 690 (“Only if an employee’s activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely 
performed by similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned with management.”). Cf. 
id. at 683 (citing Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 274, 286–89; Sutter Cmty. Hosps. of Sacramento, 
227 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976)) (“Although the Board has established no firm criteria for 
determining when an employee is so aligned, normally an employee may be excluded as 
managerial only if he represents management interests by taking or recommending 
discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy.”). 
 21. Rabban, supra note 6, at 1788.  
 22. See id. at 1794. “These amendments introduced significant ambiguities by defining 
both excluded supervisors and included professionals as employees who exercise independent 
judgment in their work.” Id. 
 23. Id. at 1778; see also id. at 1792 (“[L]itigation about professionals has focused on their 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/13
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Typically, professional workers are trained, skilled, and well paid; 
they retain responsibility, autonomy, and discretion.25 Such 
characteristics have led to the managerial and supervisory exclusion 
of some professional workers from NLRA coverage.26 The NLRA 
defines “professional employee,”27 but it fails to provide a generally 
accepted list of covered professions.28 Rather than relying upon a list 
of covered professional workers, the Board designates professional 
workers as covered when their “decisionmaking is limited to the 
routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they 
have been assigned. . . .”29  
placement in appropriate bargaining units.”). 
 24. See id.  
 25. Id.; see also id. at 1776 n.1 (“[P]rofessionals have special knowledge and skills, based 
on training with an intellectual component, which allow them a substantially greater degree of 
autonomy at work than other employees.”). 
 26. Id. at 1792. 
 27. The statute reads: 
The term “professional employee” means— 
 (a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in 
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) 
involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of 
such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be 
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an 
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged 
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher 
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an 
apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or 
physical process; or (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of 
specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), 
and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to 
qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a). 
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (2000). 
 28. Rabban, supra note 6, at 1860 n.1. But see H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 36 (1947), 
reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135–41 (listing professional employees covered by the 
NLRA). 
 29. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 690 (1980).  
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1. Defining Professionals as Managers: NLRB v. Yeshiva 
University 
Soon after the controversial Bell Aerospace ruling that the NLRA 
excludes all managers from coverage, the Supreme Court went on in 
NLRB v. Yeshiva University to define which professional workers the 
NLRA excludes as managers. In Yeshiva, the Court addressed 
whether full-time university faculty fell within the managerial 
exclusion under the NLRA.30 In 1974, the Yeshiva Faculty 
Association, the faculty’s union, sought certification from the 
Board.31 The University opposed the faculty’s certification, claiming 
that the members of its faculty who exercised managerial 
responsibilities were not “employees” within the NLRA’s 
definition.32 
The Board hearings resulted in extensive fact-finding regarding 
the nature of the faculty’s participation in university-wide 
governance.33 Subsequently, the Board reviewed the faculty’s petition 
and approved the faculty’s proposed bargaining unit.34 In ordering 
elections, the Board denied the University’s contention that its faculty 
members were managerial.35 Because the Board concluded that the 
faculty’s participation in decisionmaking resulted from its members’ 
“independent professional judgment,” the Board deemed the faculty 
to be protected against the NLRA’s managerial exclusion.36 
 30. Id. at 674. 
 31. Id. at 674–75. 
 32. Id. at 675.  
 33. See, e.g., id. at 675–76. The hearing officer found that the University’s Board of 
Trustees was ultimately responsible for university-wide policies, including “general guidelines 
dealing with teaching loads, salary scales, tenure, sabbaticals, retirement, and fringe benefits.” 
Id. at 675. However, he also found that the faculty directly participated in University 
governance through a number of faculty committees. Id. at 675–76. The hearing officer also 
established that the faculty determined its “curriculum, grading system, admission and 
matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course schedules.” Id. at 676. 
 34. Id. at 678. The bargaining unit also included “assistant deans, senior professors, and 
department chairmen, as well as associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors.” Id. 
However, “deans and directors were excluded.” Id. 
 35. Id. The Board’s previous decisions regarding the positive coverage of university 
professors guided its decision in Yeshiva. “[T]he board referred generally to the record and 
found no ‘significant’ difference between this faculty and others it had considered.” Id. 
 36. Id. at 684 (“The Board argues that the Yeshiva faculty are not aligned with 
management because they are expected to exercise ‘independent professional judgment’ while 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/13
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The faculty union won the election, but the University refused to 
bargain.37 In the ensuing unfair labor practice case, the Board again 
denied the University’s contentions.38 After the University’s 
continued refusals to negotiate, the Board sought reinforcement from 
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Second 
Circuit”).39 The Second Circuit, ruling in favor of the University, 
found that the faculty members should be excluded as managers.40 
The faculty members appealed and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.41 
In affirming the Second Circuit’s decision,42 the Supreme Court 
focused on the faculty members’ various managerial duties. The 
Court found that the faculty authorized curricula, course schedules, 
participating in academic governance, and because they are neither ‘expected to conform to 
management policies [nor] judged according to their effectiveness in carrying out these 
policies.’”). The Board further stated: 
[T]he faculty are professional employees entitled to the protection of the Act because 
“faculty participation in collegial decision making is on a collective rather than 
individual basis,” it is exercised in the faculty’s own interest rather than “in the interest 
of the employer” and final authority rests with the board of trustees. 
Id. at 678 (citations omitted). Additionally, the Board found that divided loyalty remained a 
non-issue:  
Because of [the faculty’s] independence[,] . . . there is no danger of divided loyalty and 
no need for the managerial exclusion. . . . [U]nion pressure cannot divert the faculty 
from adhering to the interests of the university, because the university itself expects its 
faculty to pursue professional values rather than institutional interests. 
Id. at 684. Ultimately, the Board concluded that “application of the managerial exclusion to 
such employees would frustrate the national labor policy in favor of collective bargaining.” Id. 
 37. Id. at 679. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. Although the Second Circuit found that the faculty were professional employees 
under 29 U.S.C. § 152(12), it criticized the Board for its failure to acknowledge the managerial 
aspects of the faculty’s positions. Id. 
[The lower] court found that the Board had ignored “the extensive control of Yeshiva’s 
faculty” over academic and personnel decisions as well as the “crucial role of the full-
time faculty in determining other central policies of the institution.” The court 
concluded that such power is not an exercise of individual professional expertise. 
Rather, the faculty are endowed with “managerial status” sufficient to remove them 
from the coverage of the Act. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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teaching methods, grading policies, matriculation standards, size of 
the student body, and tuition.43 Noting that such decisions have 
managerial characteristics,44 the Court further emphasized the 
faculty’s significant strength in determining the above policies.45 In 
finding that the NLRA excluded the faculty as managers, the Court 
disagreed with the Board’s “independent professional judgment 
standard.”46 The Court stated that the Board’s emphasis on 
independent professional judgment actually undermined the NLRA’s 
policy of protecting the workplace from divided loyalties.47 Although 
 43. Id. at 686. Further, the Court indicated that the record showed faculty playing “a 
predominant role in faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion.” Id. at 686 
n.23. Some faculty also made “final decisions regarding the admission, expulsion, and 
graduation of individual students . . . . Others have decided questions involving teaching loads, 
student absence policies, tuition and enrollment levels, and in one case the location of a 
school.” Id. at 677. 
 44. Id. at 686 n.23. However, the Court noted that these characteristics are not an 
exhaustive list of factors: 
We recognize that this is a starting point only, and that other factors not present here 
may enter into the analysis in other contexts. It is plain, for example, that professors 
may not be excluded merely because they determine the content of their own courses, 
evaluate their own students, and supervise their own research. There thus may be 
institutions of higher learning unlike Yeshiva where the faculty are entirely or 
predominately nonmanagerial. There also may be faculty members at Yeshiva and like 
universities who properly could be included in a bargaining unit.  
Id. at 690 n.31. 
 45. Id. at 677 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of faculty recommendations are 
implemented.”). Throughout the hearings, various University personnel attested to the strength 
of faculty decisions: 
One Dean estimated that 98% of faculty hiring recommendations were ultimately 
given effect. Others could not recall an instance when a faculty recommendation had 
been overruled . . . [One] Dean in six years has never overturned a promotion decision. 
The President has accepted all decisions of the Yeshiva College faculty as to 
promotions and sabbaticals, including decisions opposed by the Dean. 
Id. at 677 n.5 (citations omitted). 
 46. See id. at 687. 
 47. Id. at 687–88. The Court found that faculty and University interests were actually 
aligned: 
[T]he Board assumes that the professional interests of the faculty and the interests of 
the institution are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty member could not 
simultaneously be aligned. . . . In fact, the faculty’s professional interests—as applied 
to governance at a university like Yeshiva—cannot be separated from those of the 
institution.  
Id. at 688. 
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the courts traditionally give great deference to Board decisions, the 
Court found no rational basis for the Board’s decision in Yeshiva.48  
On the other hand, the four dissenting justices who approved of 
the Board’s decision, found its ruling “neither irrational nor 
inconsistent with the Act.”49 The dissent emphasized that the Board, 
not the judiciary, retained the primary authority to interpret the 
NLRA.50 Moreover, the dissent did not endorse the majority’s 
attempt to determine a “definitive limitation” of the definition of 
“employee.”51 
The dissent admonished the majority’s decision to exclude the 
faculty as managers.52 Disagreeing with the majority’s “aligned with 
management” test,53 the dissent stated its test as a determination that 
the employee acts “on behalf of management.”54 The dissent noted 
that the professional faculty in this case did not fall within the 
managerial exclusion, finding that the professional workers’ ability to 
influence institutional policy does not, by itself, make such workers 
It is clear that Yeshiva and like universities must rely on their faculties to participate in 
the making and implementation of their policies. The large measure of independence 
enjoyed by faculty members can only increase the danger that divided loyalty will lead 
to those harms that the Board traditionally has sought to prevent. 
Id. at 689–90. 
 48. Id. at 691. “As our decisions consistently show, we accord great respect to the 
expertise of the Board when its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and 
consistent with the Act. In this case, we hold that the Board’s decision satisfies neither 
criterion.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 The Court further noted that the standard employed by the Board was too broad. “Since the 
Board does not suggest that the ‘independent professional judgment’ test is to be limited to 
university faculty, its new approach would overrule sub silentio this body of Board precedent 
and could result in the indiscriminate recharacterization as covered employees of professionals 
working in supervisory and managerial capacities.” Id. at 687. 
 49. Id. at 691–92 (5–4 decision) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 692–93. 
 51. Id. at 693 n.1 (“[The task of defining employee] has been assigned primarily to the 
agency created by Congress to administer the Act.”). 
 52. See id. at 701.  
 53. Id. at 690. “The National Labor Relations Act does not condition its coverage on an 
antagonism of interests between the employer and the employee.” Id. at 700–01. 
 54. Id. at 698 (“The premise of a finding of managerial status is a determination that the 
excluded employee is acting on behalf of management and is answerable to a higher authority 
in the exercise of his responsibilities.”). The dissent stated that the proper test to determine 
which employees are managerial is to establish “who retains the ultimate decisionmaking 
authority and in whose interest the suggestions are offered.” Id. at 701 n.11.  
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managers.55 Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority for 
extending the managerial exclusion to professionals who did not 
demonstrate the potential to create divided loyalty problems.56 
Finally, the dissent blamed the majority for failing to recognize the 
differences between the industrial setting, to which the NLRA 
directly speaks, and the academic setting.57 
Ultimately, Yeshiva mandates that if a professional worker is 
“aligned with management,” the worker is a manager and is excluded 
from NLRA coverage.58 However, the majority was careful to limit 
its rule: if a professional worker’s responsibilities are “routinely 
performed by similarly situated professionals,” then the professional 
worker is not aligned with management.59  
2. Defining Professionals as Supervisors: “In the Interest of the 
Employer” and NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. 
Following Yeshiva, the Supreme Court justified concerns that its 
broad interpretation of the NLRA managerial exclusion would 
inevitably extend to professional workers in nonacademic settings.60 
The Court upheld its interpretation of the managerial exclusion in 
 55. Id. at 697–98. The dissent explained the inherent traits of professional workers: 
As the Board has recognized, due to the unique nature of their work, professional 
employees will often make recommendations on matters that are of great importance 
to management. But their desire to exert influence in these areas stems from the need 
to maintain their own professional standards, and this factor—common to all 
professionals—should not, by itself, preclude their inclusion in a bargaining unit. In 
fact, Congress clearly recognized both that professional employees consistently 
exercise independent judgment and discretion in the performance of their duties, and 
that they have a significant interest in maintaining certain professional standards. Yet 
Congress specifically included professionals within the Act’s coverage. 
Id. at 697 n.7 (citations omitted).  
 56. See, e.g., id. at 696 n.6 (“The anomaly of such a result demonstrates the error in 
extending the managerial exclusion to a class of essentially rank-and-file employees who do not 
represent the interests of management and who are not subject to the danger of conflicting 
loyalties which motivated the adoption of that exemption.”). 
 57. Id. at 694. “Unlike industrial supervisors and managers, university professors are not 
hired to ‘make operative’ the policies and decisions of their employer.” Id. at 699–700. 
 58. Id. at 690 (majority opinion). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Rabban, supra note 6, at 1779. 
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NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America61 (“Health 
Care”) and construed an even broader supervisory exclusion. In 
Health Care, the Board found that a group of staff nurses comprised 
a valid bargaining unit under the NLRA.62 The Board determined that 
the nurses’ responsibilities to staff, monitor, counsel, and evaluate 
aides did not rise to the level of being “in the interest of the 
employer” and, therefore, were not in conflict with the NLRA.63 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
and the Supreme Court reversed the Board’s holding.64 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that the Board 
overstepped its authority in creating a “false dichotomy” between the 
duties performed “in the interest of the employer” and those 
performed in furtherance of professional responsibilities.65 According 
to the Court, any act completed during the course of employment is 
“in the interest of the employer.”66 The Court held that the Board has 
the authority to determine only whether the professional worker 
performs one of the twelve supervisory activities outlined in the 
NLRA.67 Upon finding that the worker performs one of the twelve 
 61. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571 (1994). 
 62. Id. at 575. 
 63. Id. In fact, Board court found such responsibilities as merely incidental to professional 
skills, reasoning that the nurses spent “only a small fraction of their time exercising that 
authority.” Id. at 593 (citation omitted).  
 64. Id. at 575–76. 
 65. Id. at 577–78. The majority responded to the Board with a three-step analysis:  
[T]he Board must first determine whether the individual possesses any of the 12 
indicia of supervisory authority and, if so, whether the exercise of that authority entails 
“independent judgment” or is “merely routine.” If the individual independently 
exercises supervisory authority, the Board must then determine if that authority is 
exercised “in the interest of the employer.” 
Id. at 590 (quoting Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 493 (1993); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(11) (2000)). 
 66. Id. at 578. 
 67. Id. at 573. Congress defined “supervisor” as: 
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, 
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other 
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to 
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such 
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment. 
29 U.S.C. § 152(11).  
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listed activities, the Court ruled that the Board must exclude the 
professional worker from NLRA coverage based on the supervisory 
exclusion.68 Finally, the majority recognized the tension between the 
statutory inclusion of professionals and the statutory exclusion of 
supervisors,69 but disapproved of the Board’s attempt to alleviate the 
tension by “distorting the statutory language” regarding its 
construction of “in the interest of the employer.”70 
Four dissenting justices disagreed, arguing that the Board must 
limit the meaning of the phrase “in the interest of the employer” to 
protect the NLRA’s explicit inclusion of professional workers.71 The 
dissent found that the NLRA’s legislative history indicated that 
Congress did not intend for the supervisory exclusion to obliterate the 
professional inclusion.72 The dissent found that the Board had 
effectively reconciled the statutory tension by first determining that 
the nurses had performed one of the twelve supervisory activities, but 
then finding that the nurses’ authority came from the superior skill of 
professionals, and not from management.73 Ultimately, the dissent 
concluded that the majority’s broad interpretation of the supervisory 
 68. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571, 578–79 (1994). 
 69. Id. at 581. The majority countered the dissent’s “parade of horribles” accusation that 
the majority’s definition construes “supervisory” so broadly that there is no longer a 
professional inclusion by reiterating that the Board has the power to determine whether the 
worker performed one of twelve supervisory activities. Id. at 583–84. 
 70. Id. at 581. 
 71. Id. at 584–99 (5–4 decision) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Whether an employee is a 
professional worker protected under the NLRA depends upon the scope of the managerial and 
supervisory exclusions. Id. at 585. When there is an overlap, such as when a professional is also 
a manager, the NLRA excludes professionals from coverage. Id. However, Congress granted 
the Board the power to determine whether a worker is an included professional or an excluded 
manager or supervisor. Id.  
 72. Id. at 587–88 (quoting S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 19 (1947)). When Congress enacted the 
supervisory exclusion, it was careful to write in a professional inclusion. Id. at 588. “The 
inclusion of [the professional] . . . together with an amendment to § 9(b) of the [NLRA] limiting 
the placement of professionals and nonprofessionals in the same bargaining unit, confirm that 
Congress did not intend its exclusion of supervisors largely to eliminate coverage of 
professional employees.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 73. Id. at 590–91. The dissent emphasized, “[A]uthority does not fit within the ‘interest of 
the employer’ category if it is ‘exercised in accordance with professional rather than business 
norms,’ i.e., in accordance with ‘professional standards rather than . . . the company’s profit-
maximizing objectives.’” Id. at 590 (citing Children’s Habilitation Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 
F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
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exclusion had destroyed the NLRA’s express inclusion of 
professional workers.74 
3. Defining Professionals as Supervisors: “Independent 
Judgment” and NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care 
After the Supreme Court rejected the Board’s treatment of 
professional workers in Health Care, the Board began to utilize a 
different approach to professional workers and the managerial and 
supervisory exclusions. In NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, 
Inc.,75 the Kentucky State District Council of Carpenters sought to 
represent all 110 employees at Caney Creek, a facility caring for 
mentally ill patients.76 Caney Creek objected to the inclusion of six 
registered nurses in the bargaining unit, alleging that the nurses were 
supervisors under the NLRA and, therefore, were not properly within 
the bargaining unit.77 The Board’s Regional Director ruled that the 
bargaining unit was appropriate, and the Board denied review of the 
Regional Director’s decision.78 Caney Creek sought indirect review 
from the Sixth Circuit by committing an unfair labor practice.79  
During the Sixth Circuit hearing, the Board emphasized the three-
part test that the Supreme Court had outlined in Health Care.80 Using 
the test, the Board adopted a rule that workers do not use 
“independent judgment” when they utilize “ordinary professional or 
technical judgment” in directing other workers.81 The Sixth Circuit 
found the rule invalid, however, and held that the Board erred in 
 74. Id. at 598–99. 
 75. 532 U.S. 706 (2001). 
 76. Id. at 708–09. 
 77. Id. at 709. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 709–10. Direct judicial review of representation determinations is not available. 
Id. at 709. Therefore, employers must commit an unfair labor practice to induce the General 
Counsel of the Board to file an unfair labor practice complaint under the NLRA. Id. In 
Kentucky River, the Board heard the General Counsel’s unfair labor practice complaint and 
granted summary judgment to the General Counsel. Id. It reasoned that a bargaining unit 
determination may not be relitigated in an unfair labor practice hearing. Id. at 709–10 (citing 
Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 139–41 (1971)). 
 80. Id. at 712–13; see also supra note 65 (describing Health Care’s three-part test). 
 81. Id. at 713. 
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including the nurses in the bargaining unit because the nurses were 
supervisors.82 
In yet another 5–4 decision,83 the Supreme Court upheld the Sixth 
Circuit’s ruling84 by finding the Board’s rule inconsistent with the 
text of the NLRA.85 The majority reasoned that the Board’s rule 
turned on factors that had little to do with a worker’s “independent 
judgment” and more with the worker’s status as a professional.86 The 
majority recognized that the Board’s rule was driven by the policy 
concern that too many workers—particularly professional workers—
fall within the Court’s broad interpretation of “supervisor.”87 
Nonetheless, the majority admonished the Board for utilizing a 
strained interpretation of “independent judgment” to accomplish the 
Board’s policy goals.88 
The majority suggested alternative means for the Board to 
accomplish its goal of narrowing the supervisory exclusion. First, the 
majority indicated that the Board has the power to determine the 
scope of discretion that a worker must exercise to be a supervisor 
under the NLRA.89 Second, the majority noted that the Board may 
find that the degree of judgment that a worker exercises is 
 82. Id. at 710 (“[The Sixth Circuit] rejected the Board’s interpretation of ‘independent 
judgment,’ explaining that the Board had erred by classifying ‘the practice of a nurse 
supervising a nurse’s aide in administering patient care’ as ‘routine simply because the nurses 
have the ability to direct patient care by virtue of their training and expertise, not because of 
their connection with management.’”).  
 83. In an opinion similar to that in Health Care, the dissenting justices in Kentucky River 
criticized the Kentucky River majority’s reading of the NLRA. Id. at 727 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent found that the majority nullified 
Congress’s explicit inclusion of professional workers under the NLRA by construing 
“supervisor” too broadly. Id. at 726–27. 
 84. Id. at 722 (majority opinion). 
 85. Id. at 720. 
 86. Id. at 714 (“Let the [worker’s] judgment be significant and only loosely constrained 
by the employer; if it is ‘professional or technical’ it will nonetheless not be independent.”). 
 87. Id. at 719. 
 88. Id. at 717. 
 89. Id. at 713.  
[I]t is certainly true that the statutory term “independent judgment” is ambiguous with 
respect to the degree of discretion required for supervisory status. Many nominally 
supervisory functions may be performed without the “exercise of such a degree of . . . 
judgment or discretion . . . as would warrant a finding” of supervisory status under the 
[NLRA]. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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insufficient to make a worker a supervisor.90 Third, the majority 
suggested that the Board could distinguish “non-supervisory 
workers,” who direct other workers in “discrete tasks,” from 
“supervisory workers,” who direct other workers generally.91 
However, the Board has not yet tested these alternative methods 
before the Supreme Court, as the Court has yet to hear such a case.92 
B. The History of Unionization in American Orchestras 
American musicians of all sorts established the first musicians’ 
union in America, the American Federation of Musicians (“AFM”), 
in 1896.93 By 1904, all American symphony orchestras, except for the 
Boston Symphony Orchestra,94 operated as union shops.95 However, 
until the 1960s, the AFM did not effectively represent orchestral 
musicians because of the numerous non-orchestral musicians with 
whom the AFM dealt.96 The AFM’s inattention to orchestral 
musicians’ needs led to union militancy in the 1950s.97  
 90. Id. at 713–14. “[I]t is also undoubtedly true that the degree of judgment that might 
ordinarily be required to conduct a particular task may be reduced below the statutory threshold 
by detailed orders and regulations issued by the employer.” Id. 
 91. Id. at 720. 
 92. The Board has taken up one of the Supreme Court’s suggested alternative methods. In 
one post-Kentucky River case before the Board, the Board held that workers who led other 
workers in the testing of military equipment were not supervisors. Dynamic Sci., Inc., 334 
N.L.R.B. No. 57 (2001). The Board reasoned that the workers’ ability to direct other workers 
was limited by the employer’s rules. Id. 
 93. Lauren W. Lavine, A Force for Democracy Within the Orchestral Setting: The 
International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians, at A-3 (1983) (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, Columbia University) (on file with author). 
 94. The Boston Symphony Orchestra became a union shop in 1942. Id.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at A-2. “A problem that has plagued the musicians’ unions since their inception 
and has had substantial bearing upon shaping their historically weak relationship with 
symphony musicians is that of their broad range of professional quality.” Id.  
Another aspect unique to the labor-management relationship within the performing 
arts context—one that has direct bearing upon symphony musicians is: unions 
consisted of a membership largely dominated by a profit-oriented ‘entertainment’ 
setting. Symphony musicians were therefore a minority group, viewing themselves as 
artists who, among a broader spectrum of professional musicians, were concerned only 
with the unique work environment and lifestyle of the classical musician. 
Id. at A-5. 
 97. Id. at A-6.  
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The International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians 
(“ICSOM”) provided an organization through which orchestral 
musicians could address their union problems.98 Formally established 
in 1962, ICSOM resulted from meetings in Chicago of orchestral 
musicians from a number of orchestras, which ultimately grew to 
include delegates from many orchestras.99 ICSOM’s purpose was to 
promote “a better and more rewarding livelihood for the skilled 
performer. . . .”100 After the formation of ICSOM, the AFM could no 
longer ignore the plight of symphony orchestra musicians, who now 
constituted a united front demanding recognition.101 ICSOM lobbied 
for, and finally received, the Symphonic Services Division (“SSD”) 
of the AFM.102 Today, the SSD is an integral part of the AFM, and 
ICSOM operates as a strong conference affiliated with the Union.103  
After ICSOM’s formation, orchestral musicians’ job stability 
drastically improved.104 ICSOM’s member orchestras grew in 
number, the orchestral season length increased, and musicians’ pay 
also increased substantially.105 ICSOM then turned to work toward 
the advancement of orchestral musicians’ quality of work life.106 
Within the ranks of the Federation, symphony players, by the 1950’s, felt very much 
like second class citizens. The failure on the part of the union leadership, both locally 
and nationally, to understand the symphony players’ special problems and to support 
and promote their interests as aggressively as possible, was a crucial factor that 
contributed to the symphony musicians’ intransigent attitude towards their unions. 
Id. Further, U.S. census wage data provided evidence of the orchestral musicians’ plight. In 
1960, musicians earned an average of $4,757 per year, whereas the median wage of all 
professionals was $6,778. Id. The figures indicated that orchestral musicians’ salaries ranked 
fortieth out of forty-nine professional groups. Id. The orchestral musicians’ high level of 
training and education further exacerbated their ill feelings toward the AFM. Id.  
 98. Id. at 4–5. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 5. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 6–10. 
 103. Id. at 10. 
 104. Id. at 6–7. 
 105. For example, in 1952, no orchestra ran a fifty-two week season, and the annual wage 
for a New York Philharmonic section musician was $4,200. Id. at 6. In 1983, seventeen 
orchestras had fifty-two week seasons, and the annual wage for a New York Philharmonic 
section musician was $36,000. Id. at 6–7. 
 106. Id. at 11–19. In its beginning, ICSOM “respond[ed] to labor and form[ed] a labor 
point of view, the ‘myth of the artist had to be destroyed’—in effect, the musician as artist had 
to be played down in order to think of the musician as worker.” Id. at 11 (citation omitted). 
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1. Development of Musician Governance-Type Committees 
In response to cries for quality-of-work-life improvements, 
ICSOM worked to effect changes in the structure of the orchestra that 
would provide musicians with more input into their artistry.107 Today, 
major U.S. orchestras (ICSOM orchestras)108 offer their musicians a 
variety of committees on which they can participate. The major 
musician governance committees include artistic advisory 
committees, audition committees, music director search committees, 
and dismissal committees.109 Many orchestras have seats on the 
orchestra board for one or two of their musicians.110 
Artistic advisory committees, audition committees, and music 
director search committees work to improve artistic conditions in 
However, after achieving success in traditional union contention areas such as wages, ICSOM 
realized that it could use its newly found “credibility” with the AFM to “[address] the needs of 
its constituents . . . [and] extend to some of the broader and less tangible issues confronting the 
artist in today’s society.” Id.  
 107. Id. at 13, 15. 
 108. For the 2001–2002 symphonic season, there were fifty-one ICSOM orchestras 
comprising the countries largest and most reputable symphonic bodies. AMERICAN 
FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS, supra note 1, at 1. The following symphony, ballet, and opera 
orchestras comprise ICSOM: Alabama Symphony, Atlanta Symphony, Baltimore Symphony, 
Boston Symphony, Buffalo Philharmonic, Charlotte Symphony, Chicago Lyric Opera, Chicago 
Symphony, Cincinnati Symphony, Cleveland Orchestra, Colorado Symphony, Columbus 
Symphony, Dallas Symphony, Detroit Symphony, Florida Orchestra, Florida Philharmonic, 
Fort Worth Symphony, Grant Park Symphony, Honolulu Symphony, Houston Symphony, 
Indianapolis Symphony, Jacksonville Symphony, Kansas City Symphony, Kennedy Center 
Orchestra, Los Angeles Philharmonic, Louisville Orchestra, Metropolitan Opera, Milwaukee 
Symphony, Minnesota Orchestra, Nashville Symphony, National Symphony, New Jersey 
Symphony, New York City Ballet Orchestra, New York City Opera, New York Philharmonic, 
North Carolina Symphony, Oregon Symphony, Philadelphia Orchestra, Pittsburgh Symphony, 
Phoenix Symphony, Rochester Philharmonic, Saint Louis Symphony Orchestra, Saint Paul 
Chamber Orchestra, San Antonio Symphony, San Diego Symphony, San Francisco Ballet, San 
Francisco Opera, San Francisco Symphony, Syracuse Symphony, Utah Symphony, and 
Virginia Symphony. Id. 
 109. Id. at 12–15. 
 110. Id. at 15. Of the forty-eight ICSOM orchestras reporting data, twenty-four orchestras 
included their musicians on their boards. Id. Twenty of the orchestras reporting musicians as 
board representatives allow the musicians a vote. Id. For example, although the St. Louis 
Symphony Orchestra (SLSO) did not report data to the AFM, the SLSO does include two 
orchestra musicians on its board. Interview with Carla Johnson, General Manager, St. Louis 
Symphony Orchestra, in St. Louis, Missouri (Sept. 11, 2002). Generally, however, musicians 
sitting on symphony boards have only symbolic positions. Id. For example, the SLSO allows 
two musicians to sit on a board of approximately thirty-eight members. Id.  
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orchestras.111 For the most part, the committees perform exactly the 
functions that their titles suggest: artistic advisory committees consult 
with the music director and advise management as to the orchestra’s 
artistic season (e.g., repertoire, engaging guest conductors, and 
promoting new composers);112 audition committees hear auditions 
from potential members desiring vacant orchestral seats and cast 
votes;113 and music director search committees consider and 
recommend conductors to fill vacant directorships.114 The weight 
given to such committees’ opinions depends upon the nature of a 
specific orchestra’s collective bargaining agreement.115 For example, 
when conducting final round auditions, the Baltimore Symphony 
Orchestra affords its audition committee members116 one vote per 
committee member, whereas the Cleveland Orchestra merely allows 
its audition committee musician members to advise the Music 
Director.117 
 111. See, e.g., BOSTON SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA, TRADE AGREEMENT OF THE BOSTON 
SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA, INC.: 1998–1999, 1999–2000, 2000–2001, 2001–2002 SEASONS 1–2, 
54–63 (1998) (on-file with author). 
 112. Id. at 1. The Boston Symphony Orchestra (“BSO”) states that its Artistic Advisory 
Committee will “meet with Corporation representatives and act in an advisory and consultative 
role, providing meaningful input into artistic matters . . . [and will] be free to discuss and 
consider any and all matters of artistic implication considered in the broadest sense.” Id. 
 113. Id. at 54–65. At the BSO, each section (e.g., strings, winds, brass, etc.) has its own 
separate audition committee, which includes musicians and the Music Director (principal 
conductor). Id. at 56–59. Every orchestra uses its own audition procedure, but the BSO offers a 
four-round audition, through which candidates may advance either by committee vote or by the 
Music Director’s choice. Id. at 57–58. However, during the final round, the Music Director 
merely considers the musicians’ votes. The decision ultimately rests with the Music Director. 
Id. at 59. 
 114. In the past few years, musicians have played a greater role in the selection of music 
directors. Doreen Carvajal, Musicians Are Gaining Bigger Voice in Orchestras, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 6, 2001, at E1. The BSO, which named James Levine as its new Music Director in 2001, 
utilized its Conductor Search Committee to “advise the Corporation’s Board in the search for a 
new Music Director.” BOSTON SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA, supra note 111, at 1. The BSO 
Conductor Search Committee’s specific duties include developing a list of qualified candidates 
and soliciting rank-and-file opinions as to qualified candidates. Id.  
 115. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS, supra note 1, at 12–15. Musician-friendly 
collective bargaining agreements allow musician votes on committees and boards. Id. 
Compromise collective bargaining agreements contain mixed musician votes and advisory 
mechanisms. Id. Finally, management-friendly orchestras, such as the BSO, allow musicians 
merely to engage in advisory participation. Id. 
 116. Audition committees traditionally comprise a contractually stipulated number of rank-
and-file musicians from the section with a vacancy plus the music director. Id. at 13. 
 117. Id. The data from the 2001–2002 orchestral season offers a perspective as to the 
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Finally, dismissal committees (peer review committees) review 
rank-and-file musicians’ artistic and non-artistic termination 
proceedings.118 Most orchestras allow musicians to conduct artistic 
dismissal proceedings.119 However, in the 2001-2002 orchestral 
season, final authority for artistic dismissal rested with musician 
committees in only six ICSOM orchestras.120  
2. Characteristics of Principal Players 
Principal players are the lead players of each orchestral section, 
playing solo parts designated to their respective sections. The extent 
of each principal player’s supervisory duty depends on the 
conductor’s taste, which is not consistent amongst every ICSOM 
orchestra.121 In many orchestras, the music director and principal 
players collaborate to determine who plays which part for a given 
piece.122 Hence, principal players potentially have two supervisory 
duties: scheduling (i.e., determining who plays in which pieces) and 
casting (i.e., determining who plays which of the different parts 
within a section).123 Principal players’ duties are becoming more 
supervisory.124 Traditionally, the music director tuned and artistically 
disciplined section players.125 Recently, however, principal players 
degree of musician influence on governance-type committees. Of the forty-one orchestras 
reporting, all forty-one possess an artistic advisory committee. Id. at 12. Of the forty-nine 
orchestras reporting, all forty-nine had an audition committee comprising rank-and-file 
musicians and the music director. Id. at 13. Musicians on eighteen audition committees advised 
the music director on his final decision. Id. Sixteen audition committees employed a weighted 
vote system, which is skewed in favor of the music director’s decision. Id. Eight audition 
committees used a system demanding mutual agreement between musician committee members 
and the music director. Id. Finally, seven audition committees allowed one vote per person 
(with equal weight for the votes of musician and the music director). Id. 
 118. Id. at 14–15. 
 119. Id. All forty-six orchestras reporting, indicated that musicians sit on artistic review 
dismissal committees. Id. at 14. However, only fourteen orchestras allowed musicians to sit on 
non-artistic review dismissal committees. Id. at 15.  
 120. Id. at 14–15. Final review generally rests with arbitrators or management. Id. 
 121. Interview with Carla Johnson, supra note 110. 
 122. Id. However, Johnson noted that more managerial conductors, such as Kurt Maser, 
assign players without the aid of principal players. Id. These conductors also tend to set the 
schedule by informing the principal player as to who will play in what piece. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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have begun to work with their sections to make them qualitatively 
better by tuning and offering technical suggestions and artistic 
direction.126  
II. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court’s recent interpretations of the managerial and 
supervisory exclusions significantly narrow the NLRA’s inclusion of 
professional workers. While the Health Care decision dispelled any 
prospect of the Court retreating from its sweeping managerial and 
supervisory exclusions,127 the Kentucky River decision at least offered 
suggestions as to how the Board, employers, and workers may 
maintain professionals’ status as non-supervisory workers.128 
Nonetheless, these controversial cases have rendered the NLRA’s 
inclusion of professional workers nearly meaningless. 
A. Expansive Reading of Yeshiva, Health Care, and Kentucky River 
The breadth of the Yeshiva, Health Care, and Kentucky River 
exclusions facilitate the application of the managerial and supervisory 
exclusions to most professional workers. The Supreme Court in 
Yeshiva failed to expressly limit its holding, thus inviting a broad 
expansion of the managerial exclusion to other academic and non-
academic arenas.129 The Yeshiva decision clearly applies to the 
faculty at any “mature educational institution,” and not just to the 
Yeshiva University faculty.130 In fact, any professional worker 
participating in a governance-type committee system may be subject 
to the Yeshiva exclusion, even where the employer sets up the 
committee.131 The extraordinarily broad implications of Yeshiva may 
 126. Id. 
 127. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571, 571–72 (1994). 
 128. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 129. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 672 (1980). 
 130. JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 25 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
 131. See id. at 27. 
[Yeshiva] indicates, however, that now groups other than those with a special history 
of institutional governance may be made managers because of a committee system in 
which less than half of the group takes part. The implication is that, at least as to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/13
p313 Eastman book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Orchestrating an Exclusion 333 
 
 
 
promote an effective union-avoidance scheme for employers, through 
which they may encourage their professional workers to sit on 
governance-type committees without alerting such workers that this 
may exclude them from collective bargaining rights.132 
The reasoning behind the broad exclusion of managerial workers 
in Yeshiva extends further to the supervisory workers addressed in 
Health Care and Kentucky River.133 Broadly construed, the 
supervisory exclusion reaches professionals “with any authority to 
use independent judgment to assign and responsibly direct the work 
of other employees.”134 Most professionals use their inherent skill to 
direct other employees.135  
B. Disregard for Congressional Intent 
Because Congress explicitly included professionals, the Supreme 
Court, working through Yeshiva, Health Care, and Kentucky River, 
has potentially denied many professional workers their statutory right 
to collectively bargain.136 In 1947, when Congress created the 
supervisory exclusion under the NLRA, it also wrote the professional 
inclusion.137 It plainly was not the intent of Congress to eliminate 
professionals, a committee system may be an alternative to unionism, even if 
established unilaterally by the employer. The concept of employer-established 
committees replacing unionization was at one time clearly rejected under the NLRA as 
a technique for thwarting employee choice, but it is reemerging today in a variety of 
different contexts with court and Board approval. 
Id. 
 132. Id. at 28. 
In the course of this process a major new technique for union avoidance may have 
been created for some employers. Resolving the limits of this technique is certain to 
involve considerable litigation, serious efforts at amendment, and continued diversion 
of union efforts from organizing and collective bargaining to legal and legislative 
programs. Thus the issue of coverage shows movement from a broad labor policy 
favorable to unionization to a technical approach recognizing managerial interests and 
traditional ways of doing things. 
Id. 
 133. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571, 576–77 (1994); 
Kentucky River, 532 U.S. 706 (2001). 
 134. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 585 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)). 
 135. Id. at 588–89. 
 136. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12). 
 137. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 587. 
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professional workers’ coverage under the NLRA.138 Nonetheless, the 
Court’s expansive reading of the common law managerial and 
statutory supervisory exclusions has thwarted Congress’s protection 
of professional workers. 
C. Orchestral Musicians Risk Loss of Collective Bargaining Rights 
Since the seminal Yeshiva decision, the Board has been obligated 
to apply the managerial exclusion “whenever there [is] even the 
appearance of collegial governance.”139 Orchestral musicians sitting 
on governance-type committees run the risk of managerial exclusion 
from NLRA coverage.140 The degree of this risk depends upon how 
much weight an orchestra’s management gives to committee opinions 
and how much managerial authority musicians actually exercise.141 
For example, musicians merely sitting on artistic advisory 
committees most likely would not come under the Yeshiva 
managerial exclusion.142 Musicians created such committees in an 
 138. Id. 
 139. GETMAN ET AL., supra note 130, at 26. However, one should note that the Board did 
not apply the managerial exclusion when faculty responsibility did not “approach the standards 
of faculty governance described by the Court in Yeshiva.” Id. 
 140. Upon finding that certain orchestral musicians are managers or supervisors, a court 
may reach one of two outcomes. First, a court may exclude individuals from a bargaining unit. 
See Rabban, supra note 6, at 1857. “The NLRB has previously approved of ‘popcorn’ units; 
employees ‘pop’ out of the unit when they assume supervisory or managerial responsibilities.” 
Id. On the other hand, a court may deem an entire bargaining unit inappropriate, even if only a 
few members fall under the managerial or supervisory exclusion. Telephone Interview with 
Leonard Leibowitz, Counsel for ICSOM and the AFM Symphonic Services Division (Oct. 25, 
2002). ICSOM’s head counsel believes that the second outcome is more likely. Id.  
 141. Susan Grody, Note, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: The Professional-Managerial 
Overlap, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 659, 684 (1981). However, different orchestras give their 
committees’ opinions various degrees of weight. See, e.g., AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
MUSICIANS, supra note 1, at 13–14; Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 
140. 
 A serious issue arises in cooperative orchestras, such as the Colorado Symphony and the 
Louisiana Symphony Orchestra. Interview with Carla Johnson, supra note 111. In such 
orchestras, musicians constitute the administrators and management, yet the AFM protects them 
under a collective bargaining agreement. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra 
note 140. For example, a recent arbitration arose when the Colorado Symphony transitioned 
from the Denver Symphony, and the orchestra committee fired the concertmaster. Id. In this 
case, a court would likely uphold the Yeshiva exclusion if it heard a complaint regarding the 
composition of the bargaining unit. However, few large regional orchestras follow a 
cooperative structure. Id. 
 142. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. 
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attempt to create an ongoing dialogue with artistic management 
personnel.143 The goals of musicians serving on artistic advisory 
committees are: (1) to gain information on the upcoming artistic 
season; and (2) to provide input upon management’s request as to 
how plans will affect musicians’ quality-of-work-life.144 Musicians 
sitting on artistic advisory committees neither “formulate and 
effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative 
the decisions of their employer,” nor do they “exercise discretion.”145 
Musicians cannot take control of artistic management because they 
merely advise the artistic administration.146 
However, musicians sitting on dismissal or peer review 
committees face a high risk of managerial exclusion under the 
NLRA.147 Yeshiva specifically cites the ability to terminate as a key 
managerial feature.148 Many orchestras allow musicians sitting on 
dismissal committees to uphold or reject the music directors’ 
decisions to terminate their peers.149 Clearly, the authorization of 
such power to musicians comes very close to “effectuat[ing] 
management policies.”150 
Likewise, the supervisory exclusion, as construed by the Supreme 
Court in Health Care and Kentucky River, may bar principal players 
from NLRA coverage. Principal players in an orchestra where they 
have the power over scheduling and casting responsibilities are 
subject to the broad Health Care and Kentucky River supervisory 
exclusion.151 Such principal players arguably have the authority to 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 286–88 (1994) (citation omitted). 
 146. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. Furthermore, the 
interests of musicians and artistic management serving on artistic advisory committees do not 
align in the Yeshiva sense. Id. Musicians desire participation on such committees to prevent 
poor working conditions, but they also care deeply about the quality of the orchestra. Id. 
Orchestral management, particularly boards of directors are not so committed to quality. Id. 
Boards’ interests lie in the community service of providing an orchestra to a city. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 n.23 (1980). 
 149. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. 
 150. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 288. 
 151. In Health Care, the Court held that the Board’s determination that the nurses were not 
performing their duties “in the interest of the employer” was invalid because the Board’s 
distinction was inconsistent with Yeshiva. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of 
America, 511 U.S. 571, 576 (1994). In Yeshiva, the Court denied any distinction between 
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“assign,” “discipline,” or “direct” other employees.152 If a principal 
player has the authority to engage in one of these activities, then the 
player’s inclusion in his bargaining unit is questionable under Health 
Care and Kentucky River.  
III. PROPOSAL 
Without union protection, American orchestras as cultural 
institutions are in jeopardy.153 Orchestral management would have no 
obligations to its musicians, who most likely would lose all rights to 
bargain over job security, benefits, and wages.154 These rights 
cultivated the incredible quality of today’s orchestras by ensuring that 
highly trained musicians winning a spot in an orchestra received one 
of the best jobs in town.155 To protect America’s orchestras—and 
professional workers generally—the Supreme Court should more 
narrowly construe the managerial and supervisory worker exclusions 
under the NLRA. 
professional and institutional interests. Id. (citing Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672). Similarly, in 
Kentucky River, the Court denied the Board’s ability to narrow the supervisory exclusion by 
merely stating that professionals do not exercise “independent judgment” when they use 
ordinary professional judgment. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713 
(2001). 
 152. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). 
 153. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. “The successful use of the NLRA-protected collective bargaining mechanism has 
been a factor in maintaining relatively stable labor relations among symphony orchestra 
members and their managements. If orchestra members are denied NLRA protection because of 
the Yeshiva-Bell test, the stability that has been so painstakingly achieved might be destroyed.” 
Grody, supra note 141, at 685. Gunther Schuller, an American composer and musician, 
emphasizes: 
If the symphony orchestra is to survive, musicians, management, and the trustees must 
collaborate seriously on their collective future, must develop a respectful, serious, 
substantive dialogue rather than yell at each other from entrenched positions. They 
must work out a common future based on a common process (and progress) that will 
deal realistically with the real ‘common enemy’: those millions of people in our 
society—and their political representatives—in whose lives ‘classical music’ plays no 
part whatsoever. 
Everette J. Freeman, Research Issues in Orchestra Labor Relations, 2 HARMONY 27, 30 (1996) 
(citation omitted). 
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A. The Dissenting Opinions Properly Construe the Managerial and 
Supervisory Worker Exclusions 
The Yeshiva, Health Care, and Kentucky River Courts all reached 
a 5-4 split.156 In each of these cases, by narrowly interpreting the 
managerial and supervisory exclusions,157 the dissenting opinions 
would protect professional workers who do not actually exercise 
managerial authority.158 At the same time, the dissenting justices 
would exclude from NLRA coverage professionals who exercise 
managerial authority.159 The balance that the dissents strike upholds 
the NLRA’s professional inclusion, while also protecting 
management from the divided loyalty dilemma that led to the 
adoption of the managerial and supervisory exclusions.160 
B. Better Protection for Professional Workers from the Board 
The NLRA assigned the task of distinguishing excluded 
supervisors from included professionals to the Board.161 Moreover, 
Congress intended courts to defer to the Board’s determination and to 
review Board decisions only for rationality and consistency.162 
Nonetheless, the Yeshiva, Health Care, and Kentucky River 
majorities exhibited little regard for the Board’s determination in 
cases involving the professional worker inclusion.163 
 156. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 691 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Health 
Care, 511 U.S. at 584 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Kentucky River, 532 U.S. at 722 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 157. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 705–06; Health Care, 511 U.S. at 598–99; Kentucky River, 
532 U.S. at 722. 
 158. See Rabban, supra note 6, at 1859. Professor Rabban classifies professional workers 
as either managerial professionals or practicing professionals. Id. Because practicing 
professionals do not exercise managerial authority, such professionals should enjoy NLRA 
coverage. Id. “This scholarly distinction should become the legal criterion for determining 
when professionals are no longer employees covered by the NLRA.” Id. 
 159. See supra note 156. 
 160. Rabban, supra note 6, at 1859. 
 161. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 585–86. 
 162. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 692–94. “Through its cumulative experience in dealing with 
labor-management relations in a variety of industrial and nonindustrial settings, it is the Board 
that has developed the expertise to determine whether coverage of a particular category of 
employees would further the objectives of the Act.” Id. at 693. 
 163. In each of these cases, the Court overruled the Board’s determination that the 
professional workers were neither managers nor supervisors. See id. at 674–91; Health Care, 
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Because the Supreme Court is unlikely to adopt such a test, the 
Board must narrowly construe the managerial and supervisory 
exclusions at the agency level. The Board may narrow Yeshiva’s 
managerial exclusion somewhat through a case-by-case approach, 
distinguishing Yeshiva in each instance.164 Similarly, the Board may 
effectively narrow the supervisory exclusion through a case-by-case 
analysis utilizing the twelve activities enumerated in the NLRA’s 
definition of a supervisor. Such an analysis must focus on narrowly 
construing each of the twelve activities. Additionally, the Board may 
follow the Kentucky River majority’s suggestion of finding that a 
professional worker’s exercised degree of discretion and judgment is 
below the threshold of supervisory status.165 Finally, the Board may 
determine that a professional worker directs others in discrete, as 
opposed to general, tasks.166 By focusing on these measurements of 
supervisory status, the Board can effectively include many 
professional workers in bargaining units. 
C. Preemptive Measures for Orchestras 
Since the Bell Aerospace decision in 1974, the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated its unwillingness to afford professional workers real 
NLRA protection.167 A dispute over the collective bargaining rights 
of musicians sitting on governance-type committees, or of principal 
players, has never made it into the federal courts, but the managerial 
and supervisory exclusions construed under Yeshiva, Health Care, 
and Kentucky River constitute a present threat to many orchestral 
musicians.168 How orchestras choose to address these concerns will 
511 U.S. at 572–84; Kentucky River, 532 U.S. at 711. 
 164. The Yeshiva majority hints at such an out:  
We recognize that this a starting point only, and that other factors not present here may 
enter into the analysis in other contexts. It is plain, for example, that professors may 
not be excluded merely because they determine the content of their own courses, 
evaluate their own students, and supervise their own research.  
Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690 n.31. 
 165. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 167. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672; 
Health Care, 511 U.S. 571; Kentucky River, 532 U.S. 706. 
 168. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. 
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significantly affect the overall labor relations structure that shapes 
American orchestras today.169 
1. Maintaining Advisory-Type Committees 
Audition committees, artistic advisory committees, and music 
director search committees are generally considered advisory-type 
committees, providing a forum for management to consult musicians 
for their musical expertise.170 Musicians sitting on such committees 
have no managerial-type duties171 and run little risk of managerial 
exclusion from NLRA coverage.172 However, some orchestras permit 
their governance-type committees, particularly audition committees, 
to wield more decisionmaking power.173 For example, the Baltimore 
Symphony Orchestra allows their audition committee, comprising 
seven to eleven musicians and the Music Director, one vote per 
committee member in the final round of auditions.174 Musicians in 
this orchestra are effectively hiring their peers because the Music 
Director, with only one vote, does not have the power to overrule the 
musicians’ vote. Because Yeshiva lists hiring duties as a significant 
factor in finding managerial status,175 musicians sitting on audition 
committees modeled on the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra run a 
significant risk of Yeshiva-type managerial exclusion from NLRA 
coverage.176 
In orchestras adopting Baltimore-type audition committees, 
management may have ceded to musicians the authority to hire for 
 169. Id. 
 170. Telephone Interview with Leonard Lebowitz, supra note 140. 
 171. Id. The Supreme Court in Yeshiva focused on the faculty’s managerial duties. Yeshiva, 
444 U.S. at 686–90. Among other things, the faculty decided curriculum, scheduled classes, 
determined proper teaching methods, established grading policies, set matriculation standards, 
determined the size of the student body, and set tuition rates. Id. at 686. Unlike the Yeshiva 
faculty, orchestral musicians sitting on most artistic advisory and audition committees merely 
advise management. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. These 
musicians do not possess the authority to make Yeshiva-type decisions. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS, supra note 1, at 12–15. 
 174. Id. at 13. 
 175. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686 n.23. 
 176. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. Similarly, musicians 
sitting on dismissal committees run a Yeshiva-type risk of managerial exclusion from NLRA 
coverage if these musicians have the ultimate decision as to a musician’s dismissal. Id. 
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financial reasons: such concessions are an inexpensive means to meet 
musicians’ demands for better working conditions.177 However, 
orchestra committees accepting such concessions during contract 
talks most likely were unaware of the risk of NLRA managerial 
exclusion for those musicians sitting on Baltimore-type audition 
committees.178 To protect at-risk musicians, orchestras with 
Baltimore-type audition committees should revert to advisory-type 
audition committees in an effort to preserve NLRA coverage for all 
musicians.179 Moreover, it would behoove all musicians sitting on 
governance-type committees to review their committee duties using a 
Yeshiva-type analysis, remedying the situation if they deem their 
committee participation potentially managerial.180 
2. Maintaining the Traditional Roles of Principal Players 
Traditionally, principal players have been responsible for playing 
solos and, depending on the music director under which they are 
playing, casting and scheduling.181 Today, it is more common for 
principal players to expand their traditional duties by leading their 
section through artistic and technical advice.182 Exercising such 
“quality control” over their section may bring principal players 
within the definition of a supervisor.183 Because a court may view 
 177. See Lavine, supra note 93, at 15–17. 
 178. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. 
 179. Likewise, orchestras allowing musicians sitting on dismissal committees to possess 
final authority over musician dismissals should revert to giving such musicians only 
preliminary authority over dismissals. 
 180. Musicians should look to the Yeshiva factor list for guidance. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 
686; see also supra note 171. Because Yeshiva ultimately turns on whether professional 
workers are aligned with management interests, musicians should determine if the committee 
on which they sit possesses interests aligned with management. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 683. 
 181. Interview with Carla Johnson, supra note 110. If a music director allows principal 
players to schedule and cast other section members, principal players may be subject to the 
Health Care supervisory exclusion because principal players “assign” other musicians to pieces 
and parts. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 573–74. However, even when principal players 
schedule and cast their section members, such duties are more incidental to the principal’s main 
duty of playing the solos. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. 
Moreover, such supervision is incidental to professional nature—it is not supervision in a labor 
relations sense. Id. Hence, principal players staying within their traditional roles may avoid the 
supervisory exclusion under the NLRA. 
 182. Id. 
 183. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). 
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principal players’ exercise of these duties as disciplining or directing 
other musicians, a court may exclude such principal players as 
supervisors under the NLRA.184 
To retain NLRA coverage, principal players must ensure that their 
duties do not fall under the supervisory exclusion. Principal players 
may avoid exclusion by limiting their duties to scheduling and 
casting, which are incidental to their primary responsibilities. 
Additionally, these duties are discrete tasks. Keeping principal 
players within their traditional roles should not be detrimental to 
orchestral quality because music directors can effectively control 
quality without principal players’ assistance.185 
3. Yeshiva, Health Care, and Kentucky River as Vehicles to 
Resolve Divided Loyalty Concerns in American Orchestras 
Some commentators believe that governance-type committees and 
authoritarian principal players actually may harm the rank-and-file 
musician.186 In orchestras, reverse divided loyalty is present.187 
Musicians sitting on governance-type committees, as well as 
principal players, may actually be “sucked” into management-side 
loyalty. For example, management may influence musicians sitting 
on boards to side with management through dismal financial reports 
at board meetings. If some musicians side with management, the lack 
of musician solidarity may damage the stability of current labor 
relations provided by a strong musicians’ union.188 
Ironically, the Supreme Court may have inadvertently encouraged 
a labor stronghold through its broad managerial and supervisory 
exclusions in Yeshiva, Health Care, and Kentucky River. Due to the 
musicians’ increased risk of exclusion from NLRA coverage, these 
 184. Id. Further, the Supreme Court in Health Care and Kentucky River has effectively 
determined that it is the first prong of 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), defining the twelve supervisory 
activities, that applies in supervisory questions. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 185. In fact, music directors have traditionally been responsible for quality control. 
Interview with Carla Johnson, supra note 110.  
 186. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. 
 187. Divided loyalty is typically a management concern. The managerial and supervisory 
exclusions protect employers from the danger of their supervisors and managers siding with the 
rank-and-file. See Rabban, supra note 6, at 1778.  
 188. See Grody, supra note 141, at 685. 
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cases work together to deter musicians from serving on governance-
type committees and to discourage principal players from excessively 
supervising their sections. Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s broad 
interpretation of the managerial and supervisory exclusions may 
present the vehicle to solve alleged reverse divided loyalty in 
American orchestras, while strengthening the American Federation of 
Musicians as a union.189  
CONCLUSION 
The NLRA’s managerial and supervisory exclusions, as construed 
by the Supreme Court, put many orchestral musicians in danger of 
losing their collective bargaining protections. In particular, courts 
following the rationale in Yeshiva, Health Care, and Kentucky River 
may determine that musicians serving on governance-type 
committees and principal players are excluded managers and 
supervisors under the NLRA. These cases create an unstable labor 
relations environment in American orchestras. The Bell Aerospace 
and Yeshiva holdings construe as an excluded manager any worker 
who formulates and effectuates workplace policy in a manner aligned 
with management. At the same time, the Health Care and Kentucky 
River holdings limit the Board’s ability to find professional workers 
as non-supervisory workers. Practicing professionals, including 
orchestral musicians, inherently exercise some managerial and 
supervisory authority as a by-product of their professional training. 
However, this exercise of authority is not management in a labor 
relations sense. The implications reach far beyond university faculty, 
nurses, and orchestral musicians. After the sweeping Yeshiva, Health 
Care, and Kentucky River opinions, few professionals will qualify for 
bargaining protection under the NLRA.  
 189. Telephone Interview with Leonard Leibowitz, supra note 140. 
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